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1 Popular perceptions and common debates
The European Union (EU) has experienced throughout its history varying
levels of popular support and has revealed different levels of capacity to
deal with crises. A range of factors may account for these variations and
differences, but one thing is certain: the current circumstances, namely
ﬁnancial pressures, budgetary cuts, social instability and the present geo-
graphical and policy scope of the EU, require serious introspection and
‘soul searching’. What can be done to ensure that the EU does not perish
but, hopefully, becomes more a part of the solution than of the problem?
A signiﬁcant part of this issue relates to the fact that the EU is
continually being criticised for being an organisation that has not been
able to distance itself sufﬁciently from its roots in economic integration.
Sectors of both academic and popular discourses also promote the idea
that the EU consistently favours market values over social interests and
human rights. To what extent these discourses contain an element of
truth is, however, a matter of contention. Increasingly, academics
have been dealing with relevant aspects of this debate, most
commonly in relation to individual policy ﬁelds such as labour law,1
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social welfare,2 freedom, security and justice,3 minority rights,4 and
neighbourhood and external policies.5 Some academics do strive for a
more encompassing approach, by dealing with notions of justice and
solidarity,6 EU human rights policies7 and socio-economic models more
generally,8 whilst also adopting moral and philosophical approaches,9
and using particular areas for ‘case studies’.10 Non-academic and civil
society movements, such as the occupy (or the 99 per cent) movement,
have also contributed to the debate about progressing towards a society
which is socially and economically more egalitarian.
A common thread for many of those authors who adopt a legal
approach to their subject-matter seems to be the focus on the duality of
social and economic values; they thus conﬁne their analyses to this duality
and concentrate on values as such – in other words they focus on abstract
2 Michael Dougan and Eleanor Spaventa (eds.), Social welfare and EU law (Oxford: Hart,
2011).
3 Hans Lindahl (ed.), A right to inclusion and exclusion? Normative fault lines of the EU’s
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Oxford: Hart, 2011); Steve Peers, EU Justice and
Home Affairs Law, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
4 Tawhida Ahmed, The impact of EU law on minority rights (Oxford: Hart, 2011); Kyriaki
Topidi, EU law, minorities and enlargement (Mortsel: Intersentia, 2010).
5 Urfan Khaliq, Ethical dimensions of the foreign policy of the European Union: a legal
appraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Päivi Leino and Roman
Petrov, ‘Between “common values” and competing universals: the promotion of the
EU’s common values through the European neighbourhood policy’ (2009) 15(5) Euro-
pean Law Journal 654–671.
6 On justice, see, for example, Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, ‘The problem of justice in the
European Union: values, pluralism, and critical legal justice’, in Julie Dickson and Pavlos
Eleftheriadis (eds.), Philosophical foundations of European Union law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), pp. 412–448; on solidarity, see, for example, Andrea Sangiovanni,
‘Solidarity in the European Union: problems and prospects’, in Dickson and Eleftheriadis
(eds.), Philosophical foundations, pp. 384–411.
7 Giacomo Di Federico (ed.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: from declaration to
binding instrument (Dordrecht and New York: Springer, 2011); Sybe de Vries, Ulf Bernitz
and Stephen Weatherill (eds.), The protection of fundamental rights in the EU after Lisbon
(Oxford: Hart, 2013).
8 For example, Marie-Ange Moreau (ed.), Before and after the economic crisis: What
implications for the ‘European Social Model’? (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2011); Dagmar Schiek,
Ulrike Liebert and Hildegard Schneider (eds.), European economic and social constitu-
tionalism after the Treaty of Lisbon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
9 Andrew Williams, The ethos of Europe: values, law and justice in the EU (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010).
10 For instance, migration, company law and healthcare in the case of Schiek, Liebert and
Schneider (eds.), European economic and social constitutionalism, and services of general
interest and social security in the case of Niklas Bruun, Klaus Lörcher and Isabelle
Schömann (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty and social Europe (Oxford: Hart, 2012).
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notions. Other authors examine abstract (human) rights without sufﬁ-
ciently considering individuals’ contexts, communities and relationships.
Yet, such a focus on (human) rights contributes to the danger of pitting
opposing rights and, therefore, individuals and entities, against each other.
This, several scholars have argued, fuels a society of conﬂict and selﬁshness
(as opposed to dialogue, peaceful coexistence and cooperation), and points
to the limitations of a socio-legal system based exclusively or mostly on
(individual, human) rights.11 Also, the ‘legalism, individualism and
statism’ into which human rights have fallen have deprived them of much
of their radical, creative and resistance potential, reﬂecting a ‘limited idea
of humanity’.12 Rights and conﬂicts do retain an important role in society,
as they allow individuals their essential space of autonomy, expression and
self-esteem. The possibility of claiming rights should, therefore, be upheld
under all circumstances, but they should not dominate social and legal
lives – room needs to be found for experimentation with alternative and
complementary frameworks. At any rate, the current human rights check
undertaken by EU institutions in their law and policy-making activities is
beset by several shortcomings, and is not sufﬁcient to provide humane
outcomes across the board.13
One key question is: where do ordinary human beings, in all their
complexity and inter-connectedness, feature in these debates? How do
these values and rights actually affect individuals and the communities in
which they live? Should law not exist for people, for the sake of people?
Can we not think of a more imaginative and just way of ‘doing’ law and
justice, in order to offer a system more inclusive of all voices? Since law is a
social, regulatory tool aimed at improving relationships between human
beings for the sake of a ‘good’ society, what values should law promote?
And how could these values become rooted in personal ways of life?
Placing more emphasis on individuals and their contexts, and how indi-
viduals (individually and in their relationships) should be treated and
considered more generally, can generate a number of refreshing insights
and policy recommendations. Treating the legal and the ethical as an
integrated whole forms the rationale of this book.
11 See, for example, Wiktor Osiatyński, Human Rights and their Limits (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 196 ff, and scholars discussed therein.
12 Illan rua Wall, Without model or warranty (London and New York: Routledge, 2012),
pp. 15 and 43.
13 Israel De Jesus Butler, ‘Ensuring compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights in
legislative drafting: The practice of the European Commission’ (2012) 37(4) European
Law Review 397–418.
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2 Beyond social versus economic, beyond individual versus
corporate, beyond rights
Placing more emphasis on the complexity of the lives of people whilst
analysing the quality of EU law and policy can be described as a human-
centred analysis – one that moves away from the orthodox socio-
economic dialectics and rights-centredness in the debates about the
adequacy and effectiveness of EU law and policy. But one should strive
to go beyond this and characterise that human-centredness. What type of
human-centredness are we concerned with? The answer is a ‘humane’
human-centredness. Indeed, the ‘yearning for a more humane society in
which (. . .) inhumanities are diminished or abolished dominates [our
common] consciousness’ and ‘[h]umaneness is the corrective of human-
ity when it is not at its best’.14 Humaneness in law and outside it is not a
complete novelty, as it is a known concern particularly with regard to
humanitarian law and economics.15 More generally, humaneness, par-
ticularly in the form of empathy and compassion, has been the object of
Schweitzer’s ethical human consciousness model in his philosophy of
‘Reverence for Life’16 and Rifkin’s ‘soft-wired’ empathic civilisation
vision of a collaborative and caring world.17 Yet, the concern with
humaneness has, to our knowledge, never explicitly been voiced with
regard to EU law and institutions overall. May ‘becoming more humane’
and less ‘elite dominated’ and ‘power centred’ be the answer for EU law?
‘Humane’ may be deﬁned in different ways, including compassionate,
kind, sympathetic, tolerant, benign and humanitarian.18 Western ethics
have engaged with the concept of humaneness, namely by placing
emphasis on cultivating empathy and compassion globally,19 as well as
the need to consciously choose a humane moral code of conduct to
14 H. S. Broudy, ‘Criteria for a humane society’ (1977) 8(1) Educational Studies 37–50 at
37–38.
15 In humanitarian law, see, for example, Theodor Meron, ‘The humanisation of humani-
tarian law’ (2000) 94 American Journal of International Law, 239; in economics, see, for
example, Ernst Friedrich Schumacher, Small is beautiful: A study of economics as if people
mattered (London: Blond and Briggs, 1973).
16 Albert Schweitzer, The decay and the restoration of civilization, 2nd edn (London: Black,
1932); Albert Schweitzer, Civilization and ethic, 3rd edn (London: Black, 1946).
17 Jeremy Rifkin, The empathic civilization: The race to global consciousness in a world in
crisis, 1st edn (New York: Tarcher, 2009).
18 Maurice Waite (ed.), Oxford paperback thesaurus, 4th edn (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012).
19 Karen Armstrong, Twelve steps to a compassionate life (London: The Bodley Head, 2010).
4 nuno ferreira
protect our common humaneness.20 Broudy, for example, suggests that
the criteria for assessing how ‘humane’ a society is should consist of
idealisation (in relation to new borders of individual achievement),
justice (in the sense of fair sharing of rewards and sacriﬁces), and
compassion (with regard to those individuals ‘failed’ by their character-
istics).21 Levinas, perhaps more than any other Western philosopher, has
convincingly argued in favour of a more humane and empathic approach
to ethics.22 Non-Western cultures, however, seem to have made a more
sophisticated use of the notion of ‘humaneness’ in broader contexts up to
the present day. So, to avoid the mistake of cultural narrowness, it is
crucial to seek what other cultures may have to offer us on this notion.
Indeed, ‘[t]he more one is able to leave one’s cultural home, the more
easily is one able to judge it, and the whole world as well, with the
spiritual detachment and the generosity necessary for true vision.
The more easily, too, does one assess oneself and alien cultures with
the same combination of intimacy and distance’.23
Chinese traditional culture, through the Confucian notion of ‘jen’ (pro-
nounced ‘ren’), places enormous value on humaneness, as a way of
achieving balance, empathy and the moral standard. The deﬁnition of
‘jen’ is a topic in itself, as it can be translated as humanity, (universal) love
or, perhaps most accurately, humaneness.24 Whatever the deﬁnition, it is
certain that ‘jen’ has remained a central concept of Confucianism for more
than 2,000 years, and that, although it can refer to particular virtues, it is
also meant as the basic virtue of a comprehensive ethical doctrine, ‘the
moral standard governing one’s entire life’.25 The beginning of ‘jen’ lies in
the ‘empathic heart’, thus completely interweaving humaneness, empathy
and (universal) love, all applicable equally to individuals and govern-
ments.26 Although essentially a moral consciousness, ‘jen’ is a productive
20 Abraham Olivier, ‘Phenomenology of the human condition’ (2011) 30(2) South African
Journal of Philosophy 184–196 at 192–193. See, also, Bernward Gesang, ‘Utilitarianism
with a human face’ (2005) 39 The Journal of Value Inquiry, 169–181.
21 Broudy, ‘Criteria for a humane society’, 39.
22 See, for example, Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the other: And additional essays (transla-
tion by Richard A. Cohen) (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1987, 1997
printing).
23 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1987), p. 259.
24 Wing-Tsit Chan, ‘Chinese and Western interpretations of jen (humanity)’ (1975) 2
Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 107–129 at 120.
25 Ibid., 107–108.
26 Hongxing Chen, ‘Reproduction, familiarity, love, and humaneness: How did Confucius
reveal “humaneness”?’ (2010) 5(4) Frontiers of Philosophy in China 506–522.
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and contextual notion as well, to the extent that it is a tool for practical
activity and its interpretation may vary depending on the context.27 Along
these lines, Chen sees ‘jen’ (as humaneness) as something inherent in birth,
but that needs to be fully aroused and cultivated as part of one’s personal
development and fulﬁlment in life, as part of one’s ‘Way of Humane-
ness’.28 The ‘golden mean’ – an average between ‘excesses’ and ‘deﬁcien-
cies’ – is something for which all individuals and organisations should
perpetually strive to reﬁne their ‘humaneness’.29 In that sense, it is an ideal
notion to assess practical initiatives, such as EU legal and policy tools, a
conclusion reinforced by the fact that Confucius’s emphasis on leadership
with integrity is still bearing fruit today.30
Confucian philosophy has been deeply ingrained in Chinese culture
for many centuries and has contributed to it in many positive ways.
Although Confucianism is often criticised for stiﬂing individual rights
and autonomy, it can in fact be seen as a philosophy that ‘conceives
a fully human life in terms of relationship to others, structured by a set
of duties to them that realize the self rather than constrain it’.31 Indeed,
Confucian thought has ingrained in it the notions of equality, respect
and legitimate claims against wrongdoings.32 This is very close to
Western philosophies that focus on rights and the individual. Indeed,
Confucianism seems to acknowledge that individual rights need viable
communities to make good use of moral agency and democratic insti-
tutions, the same way as communities need to be aware of the need to
protect individual rights in order for the common good to be safe-
guarded.33 Being able to ﬁnd inspiration in Far Eastern philosophy to
gain insights into Western policies shows that building cultural and
political bridges between these two geo-political areas of the world is
possible. The concept of ‘jen’ has been contributing to these bridges since
Confucius’s main works began to be translated into European languages
27 Chan, ‘Chinese and Western interpretations of jen (humanity)’, 124–126.
28 Chen, ‘Reproduction, familiarity, love, and humaneness’, 520–521. 29 Ibid., 520.
30 Patrick Kim Cheng Low and Sik Liong Ang, ‘The theory and practice of Confucian value
of integrity: The Brunei case study’ (2012) 7(14) International Journal of Business and
Management 114–124.
31 Kwong-loi Shun and David B. Wong, ‘Introduction’, in Kwong-loi Shun and David B.
Wong (eds.), Confucian ethics: A comparative study of self, autonomy, and community
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 2.
32 Craig Ihara, ‘Are individual rights necessary? A Confucian perspective’, in Shun and
Wong (eds.), Confucian ethics: A comparative study, pp. 11 ff.
33 David B. Wong, ‘Rights and community in Confucianism’, in Shun and Wong (eds.),
Confucian ethics: A comparative study, pp. 31 ff.
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in the seventeenth century.34 Perhaps a sign of the impact of Confucius’s
works is that the ‘Western sense of consciousness’ – one that nowadays
entails an awareness of the relational and global consciousness connect-
ing the whole human race – has slowly come to resemble the Asian one,
despite having taken different paths to arrive at its ﬁnal destination.35
In the African context, the notion of ‘ubuntu’ has served as the
gateway through which humaneness similarly inﬁltrates all aspects of
society, including law and policy, namely by focusing on participation,
reconciliation, reciprocity, co-responsibility, interdependence, respect
and equality. A concept cultivated for centuries in African customary
legal systems, ‘ubuntu’ has been translated in many different ways (most
commonly humaneness), but it can be said to possess even more wide-
ranging and contextual connotations.36 Besides being commonly
accepted as a concept that should inform areas as wide-ranging as
business management,37 theology and culture more generally, ‘ubuntu’
has also become a constitutional value and has thus permeated law across
the board, from public law (constitutional, criminal and administrative)
to private law (property, family, delict and contract).38 Remarkably
similar to the Confucian ‘golden mean’ notion, ‘ubuntu’ also aims to
lead people to live the ‘right way’, a way that sees the individual as a
member of the community and living in a civil, respectful, digniﬁed,
harmonious and compassionate way.39 As a holistic and overarching
norm, ‘ubuntu’ is undoubtedly in a privileged position to render South
Africa’s law and policy more humane and caring.
In the Western context, the feminist movement has contributed to the
development of a critique of male-centred thinking and knowledge, and
has had a profound impact on all areas of academic study and policy-
making. This has had the indirect effect of, in an unprecedented way,
eventually bringing up in public discourse notions related to the core of
‘jen’ and ‘ubuntu’. By looking at the development of morality and notions
of justice from a gender perspective, Gilligan’s seminal work, In a
different voice, propelled individuals researching and working in a range
34 Chan, ‘Chinese and Western interpretations of jen (humanity)’, 117–118.
35 Jeremy Rifkin, The European dream: How Europe’s vision of the future is quietly eclipsing
the American dream (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), p. 377.
36 T. W. Bennett, ‘Ubuntu: an African equity’ (2011) 14(4) Potchefstroom Electronic Law
Journal 30–61, at 30–31.
37 Mzamo P. Mangaliso, ‘Building competitive advantage from ubuntu: management
lessons from South Africa’ (2001) 15(3) Academy of Management Executive 23–33.
38 Bennett, ‘Ubuntu: an African equity’, 31–46. 39 Ibid., 47–48.
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of ﬁelds to look differently at their subject-matters.40 It slowly became
commonplace to pay closer attention to gender dimensions in the con-
struction of theories and models, namely by considering that relation-
ships and caring occupy an important role in people’s lives – a role often
neglected by male-dominated notions of justice and rights. This ethic-of-
care analytical approach across ﬁelds also inevitably had ramiﬁcations in
relation to legal scholarship. West, for example, has become a stalwart
defender of law-makers and law-adjudicators tempering the dominance
of the ethic-of-justice (characterised by universal rules, consistency,
reason, rights, the public sphere and masculine virtues) with the ethic-
of-care (characterised by particularity, context, affect, relationship, the
private sphere and femininity) – in other words, demanding the acknow-
ledgement that ‘justice must be caring if it is to be just, and that caring
must be just if it is to be caring’.41 More recent work on the ethic-of-care
and law has reﬂected the extent of the impact that such ethics can have
across a range of legal ﬁelds at a domestic level, including family, medical
and tort law.42 There is no reason why such analysis could not also be
carried out across the policies within the remit of the EU.
The extent to which the much more recent Western and feminist-
inspired ethic-of-care resonates with the notions of ‘jen’ and ‘ubuntu’ is
striking. Indeed, a ‘jen’ approach requires a human-oriented concern in
everything one does, and even (political and business) leaders are required
to be caring.43 In addition, Confucianism more generally advocates
particularistic and affectionate approaches to people, as well as the insep-
arability of the familial (private) and political (public) self.44 Moreover,
in a similar way to the ethic-of-care, Confucianism and ‘jen’ in particular
require that reason and abstract justice are to be tempered with (but
not eclipsed by) moral feeling and particularistic considerations.45 The
potential synergy between the ethic-of-care and Confucian philosophy
has not gone unnoticed: Pang-White has rightly observed that Western
40 Carol Gilligan, In a different voice: Psychological theory and women’s development (Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982).
41 Robin West, Caring for justice (New York and London: New York University Press,
1997), p. 24.
42 Jonathan Herring, Caring and the law (Oxford: Hart, 2013).
43 Low and Ang, ‘The theory and practice of Confucian value of integrity’, 116.
44 A. A. Pang-White, ‘Reconstructing modern ethics: Confucian care ethics’ (2009) 36




feminist care ethics models would gain more from allying themselves to
Confucian ethics – namely ‘jen’ – than to Kantian or Aristotelian phil-
osophy.46 Most importantly, and also according to Pang-White, this
alliance between the ethic-of-care and Confucian thought leads to a
‘humane care approach to ethics [that] is not only intrinsically valuable
but also makes the management of a political state more humane and less
costly for all parties involved’.47 The same undoubtedly applies to larger
political entities, such as the EU.
It is fair to acknowledge that some scholarly work does already go
beyond the social versus economic, the individual versus corporate, and
the rights debates, thus touching upon some of the aspects entailed in
‘jen’, ‘ubuntu’ and the ethic-of-care. Sen’s and Nussbaum’s work is
especially known for focusing squarely on the human being by develop-
ing a human capabilities approach to policy-making, especially at an
economic and developmental level.48 With regard to the EU in particular,
Williams, for example, has argued in several of his works for a more
(socially) just EU, namely one that follows a human rights based
approach.49 Other authors, such as Mückenberger, even use the adjective
‘humane’, but mostly limited to the perspective of the ‘human dignity’ of
individual workers and with the struggle between social and economic
rights as the main background.50 ‘Humanisation’ has also been conceived
as an interpretative EU law principle, but only in relation to the limited
remit of the working time regulatory framework.51 This is undoubtedly
very positive and commendable, but the approach we are arguing for
goes beyond justice, rights, the social versus economic, and the individual
versus corporate approaches, and their application to limited areas of EU
law. We are arguing for a humanistic philosophy and for humaneness to
46 Ibid. 47 Ibid., 211.
48 Amartya Sen, Inequality reexamined (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Amartya
Sen, Development as freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 2000); Martha Nussbaum,
Frontiers of justice (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Belknap, 2006).
49 Andrew T. Williams, ‘Taking values seriously: towards a philosophy of EU law’ (2009) 29
(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 549–577; Andrew T. Williams, ‘Promoting justice after
Lisbon: Groundwork for a new philosophy of EU law’ (2010) 30(4) Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 663–693; Williams, The ethos of Europe Fn. 9.
50 Ulrich Mückenberger, ‘Towards a post-Viking/Laval manifesto for social Europe’ (2011)
1 CELLS Online Paper Series, 9–10.
51 See, for example, Stephen Hardy, ‘Harmonising European working time in an enlarged
EU: A case of failed “humanisation”?’ (2006) 22 International Journal of Comparative
Labour Law and Industrial Relations 543; and Alan Bogg, ‘Of holidays, work and
humanisation: A missed opportunity?’ (2009) 34(5) European Law Review 738–753.
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be the benchmark against which the adequacy and enforcement of EU
law and policy across the board should be analysed – hence promoting a
compassionate, empathic, inter-connected and caring ‘right way’ of
doing and living politics and norms. We are therefore adopting an
(areligious) ethicist framework in this book, an ethics informed by
Western (feminist) ethics-of-care, Confucian philosophy and African
customary law, which offers a valuable tool to improve the current EU
state of affairs.
This approach, we argue, can help reinvent law on the basis of life
experience and improve the societies in which we live, whilst also making
great strides in offering the ‘cauterised Other’ a voice,52 and ﬁghting
against what Derrida named the ‘original violence’.53 Yet for this to
happen, the use of such a framework should, undoubtedly, occur without
falling into authoritarian, oppressive or communitarian traps. Indeed, the
aim is not to lead the EU to become a ‘benevolent dictator’, but simply a
more humane organisation at all levels, one within which all individuals
are active participants and valued members of society, respected in their
individuality. An approach to law and policy-making based on humane-
ness can also be important for addressing the limitations of the human
rights discourses, as it may help to reach more consensual and generally
agreeable solutions, less charged by conﬂict, even when addressing
human rights conﬂicts. Conﬂict would not be completely precluded
(and should not, as conﬂict needs to be acknowledged and may be
productive), but the level of conﬂict would undoubtedly be reduced to
more tolerable and manageable levels, especially in comparison with law
and policy-making based mostly on a rights approach. Most importantly,
and in common with Douzinas’s ‘non-metaphysical humanism’, the
framework we propose would reﬂect the idea that:
(. . .) we have been destined to be near Being and to care for the human as
well as the other entities in which Being discloses itself. (. . .) the overall
form of the social bond would change from right and principles to being-
in-common, to the public recognition and protection of the becoming-
human with others, a dynamic process which resists all attempts to hold
humanity to an essence decided by the representative of power.54
52 William Paul Simmons, Human rights law and the marginalized Other (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011).
53 Jacques Derrida, ‘Force of law: The “mystical foundation of authority”’, in Drucilla
Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (eds.), Deconstruction and the
possibility of justice (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 3–67.
54 Costas Douzinas, The end of human rights (Oxford: Hart, 2000), pp. 215–216.
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Individual rights, and particularly a ‘ﬂoor of rights’, should retain a key
role in any law and policy-making mechanism – yet they simply become
one variable amongst others, all variables being considered to reach the
most humane outcomes.
Bearing this framework in mind, how does one determine whether the
EU is an organisation that lacks humaneness, in the sense of lacking
compassion and sympathy for those affected by it and not giving enough
consideration to people’s lives in all their complexity, interrelationships
and dependences? Rifkin’s famous work has obliquely touched upon this
question, by suggesting that the EU is particularly exceptional as a
cooperative and networked space, where ‘[m]ultilevel governance net-
works are like giant laboratories for the exploration of empathy’.55
Despite the cogent and extensive argumentation of Rifkin in support of
seeing the EU as following an empathic paradigm of politics, do EU law
and policy really achieve a synthesis of individual, social, economic and
corporate interests in a humane way? This book aims to answer this
question, by analysing the development of, and the state of affairs in a
range of EU policy ﬁelds that affect people’s lives and have been the
subject of much criticism.
3 Going about assessing ‘humaneness’
Assuming that the EU should be a humane organisation, one producing
humane law and policy, how can one go about assessing whether that is
generally already the case or whether there is scope for improvement?
The aim of this book is precisely to carry out this assessment, by drawing
from a range of examples from EU law and policy and analysing them,
bearing in mind the framework sketched out in the previous section.
Such individual analyses will serve as the basis for a thorough analysis of
the EU state of affairs from a ‘humaneness’ point of view. The analytical
framework devised earlier remains purposefully ﬂexible and open-ended,
as exactly what ‘humane’ will look like in practice will depend on each
policy ﬁeld being considered – indeed, the framework offered is situ-
ational, relational and relies on a constructed, but still rational, notion of
humaneness (as opposed to a natural, discovered, absolute and authori-
tarian notion).56 We do not purport to have created a recipe to achieve
55 Rifkin, The European dream, pp. 280 ff.
56 Similarly in relation to the notion of morality, see Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Constructivism in
ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
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the ‘right’ law and policy, but, instead, simply a tool to assist in the
assessment and production of progressively better law and policy. The
openness of the framework devised also has the advantage of rendering it
adaptable to any ﬁeld of competence of the EU and to the individual
circumstances of any EU Member State.
The focus of the book is on EU (statutory and judicial) law, as law is a
key instrument in pursuing and reﬂecting the EU’s objectives and values.
Law is also a policy tool from which people are not able to escape, thus
being subject to its effects to an extent that does not occur in relation to
other policy instruments. Contributions, however, cover both hard and
soft law instruments. The focus is placed on exploring the degree of
humaneness that EU law reﬂects and promotes. Contributions dedicate
special attention to the post-Treaty of Lisbon state of affairs, in order to
grasp the impact (if any) that the new institutional, law-making and
competence arrangements, as well as more recent instruments and ini-
tiatives, have had.
Contributors to this book originate from a range of disciplines and
institutions from several European countries, and include both academ-
ics with an established international reputation and younger academics
who are already beginning to make an impact in their ﬁeld. This ensures
that the book reﬂects the variety of existing opinions and research, and
brings to the arena new ideas. Also, and despite the legal focus, contri-
butions offer a cross-disciplinary and policy-oriented treatment of their
subject-matter: legal, political science, sociological and philosophical
perspectives are considered throughout the book, and contributors offer
policy recommendations with a view to achieving a more humane EU
law and the improved treatment of those affected by it.
The book is divided into three parts: the ﬁrst part concentrates on how
humaneness and related concepts have been or can be taken on board
when pushing forward the European integration project. Dagmar Schiek
leads these contributions to consider the EU’s socio-economic consti-
tution under the lens of humaneness, and argues that the EU’s unique
socio-economic constitution demands equilibrium of socio-economic
integration instead of widening the gap between economic integration
at EU levels and social integration at national levels. Dalvinder Singh
zooms into the EU’s response to the ﬁnancial crisis and takes a wider
normative approach to the European Stability Mechanism to ensure that
‘critical social functions’ are properly safeguarded. Noreen O’Meara
considers the EU framework for protection of fundamental rights and
questions how it can be rendered more humane. Finally, Aurelia Colombi
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Ciacchi and Adam McCann focus on European private law and, by using
the right to health care as a case study, assess whether EU private law
reﬂects a sufﬁcient degree of humaneness.
The second part of the book looks at those ﬁelds in EU law and policy
that, by their own nature, already have human beings at their centre, but
may not afford them a sufﬁciently humane treatment. Agata B. Capik
starts off by looking into the position of individuals before the EU
Courts, in particular with regard to cases related to the EU freedom,
security and justice policies, and suggests how those particular courts
could be reformed to enhance a more humane treatment of claimants.
Two contributions focusing on EU citizenship follow, from different
perspectives and focusing on different aspects, but both concerned with
how humanely this legal status is interpreted and applied. Whilst Steph-
anie Reynolds assesses how this EU status has been interwoven, some-
times contentiously, with human rights discourses, Päivi Neuvonen looks
at EU citizenship from the point of view of philosophical and political
personalism, and considers to what extent citizens are recognised as
people. Dora Kostakopoulou and I shift the attention to the discrimin-
atory enforcement of free movement and citizenship more generally,
using the Roma as a case study and evaluating the degree of humaneness
in this ﬁeld of law by dissecting the approach of the EU to discriminatory
events involving the Roma. This part of the book concludes with two
contributions on two aspects of EU law and policy where the degree of
humaneness is an outstanding element to consider: asylum and stateless-
ness. Dallal Stevens explores the EU’s asylum policy and, in particular,
discusses the potential of refocusing on ‘the human’ for the complex
issues facing forced migrants. Julia Bradshaw looks at statelessness from
an Arendtian philosophical perspective, and asserts alternative, more
humane foundations for EU citizenship that could help stateless
individuals.
The third and last part of this book looks outwards and explores
whether the EU’s external policies are sufﬁciently humane. Kamil
Zwolski, Stephen Rozée and Christian Kaunert examine the EU’s
approach to international security and its degree of humaneness, or at
least its potential degree of humaneness. Julia Schmidt’s contribution
focuses on crisis management tools and their impact on human rights
and humanitarian law, thus looking at this ﬁeld from a humaneness
point of view. Samantha Velluti reﬂects upon the EU’s promotion of
labour standards as human rights through its common commercial
policy, and what this tells us about the humaneness of the EU. Finally,
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Päivi Leino assesses the humaneness of the EU’s development aid policy,
unpacking inconsistencies and shortcomings in this ﬁeld.
Dora Kostakopoulou closes this edited collection with some reﬂections
on guidelines that could frame a humanistic philosophy for (a more
humane) EU. We are conscious that such a path towards becoming a
more humane organisation is a never-ending one. After all, ‘because the
humane society is a balance among trends that develop dialectically, that
balance is always breaking down and social reform is always needed to
restore it’.57 We hope that this book will make a signiﬁcant contribution
to the unremitting process of socio-legal reform leading to a more
humane EU.
57 Broudy, ‘Criteria for a humane society’, 50.
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